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99-1823 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
Ruling Below (4h Cir., 193 F.3d 805, 68 U.S.L.W. 1215, 9 A.D. Cas. 1313):
Employee's agreement to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims does not
preclude Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from suing for injunctive relief
against employer but does bar EEOC from suing for monetary and other make-whole relief
on employee's behalf.
Question Presented: Does employee's agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes
with employer bar EEOC, as plaintiff in enforcement action against employer, from
obtaining victim-specific remedies for discrimination against employee, such as back pay,
reinstatement, and damages?
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
WAFFLE HOUSE INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
Decided October 6, 1999
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question of first
impression in this circuit whether and to
what extent the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), in
prosecuting a suit in its own name, is
bound by a private arbitration agreement
between the charging party and his
employer. Other circuits are split on the
proper response to this question.
Carpe EE OC v Iidder, Peabxdy & Ca,
156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that
an arbitration agreement between a
charging party and an employer
precludes the EEOC from seeking
purely monetary relief in federal court on
behalf of the charging party but not from
seeking broad injunctive relief), nath
EEOC v Frank' Nwsery & Cra, In,177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that
a private arbitration agreement does not
affect the scope of the EEOC's federal
court suit at all).
Recognizing that the EEOC is vested
with enforcement authority both to seek
broad-based injunctive relief in the
public interest and to seek "make-
whole" relief on behalf of a charging
party, we conclude (1) that the EEOC
cannot be compelled, by reason of an
arbitration agreement between the
charging party and his employer, to
arbitrate its claims, but (2) that, to the
extent that the EEOC seeks to obtain
"make-whole" relief on behalf of a
charging party who is subject to an
arbitration agreement, it is precluded
from seeking such relief in a judicial
forum Accordingly, we affirm the
district court's decision to deny Waffle
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House's petition to compel arbitration
generally and remand to the district court
for consideration of the EEOC's claims
in light of this opinion.
I
On June 23, 1994, Eric Baker, who was
seeking employment, entered the Waffle
House facility located at exit 113 of
Interstate 26 in Columbia, South
Carolina, and proceeded to fill out and
sign an application for employment with
Waffle House, Inc. He left blank the
space on the application asking what
position he sought. The application
included a provision requiring the
applicant to submit to binding
arbitration "any dispute or claim
concerning Applicant's employment with
Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or
Franchisee of Waffle House, Inc., or the
terms, conditions or benefits of such
employment." Although the manager at
that Waffle House facility, Lee Motlow,
asked Baker whether he wanted the job
there, Baker declined and instead, called
the manager of a nearby Waffle House
facility located at exit 110 of Interstate
26 in West Columbia, to whom Motow
had referred Baker. * * * The West
Columbia Waffle House manager
interviewed Baker and hired him to
begin work two weeks later. Baker did
not fill in another application and began
work in the West Columbia facility on
August 10, 1994, as a grill operator.
At his home, approximately two weeks
later, Baker suffered a seizure, ostensibly
caused by a change in the medication he
was taking to control a seizure disorder
that had developed as a result of a 1992
automobile accident. The next day, just
after arriving for work, Baker suffered
another seizure. Waffle House
discharged Baker on September 5, 1994,
stating in the separation notice that "We
decided that for [Baker's] benefit and
safety and Waffle House it would be best
he not work any more."
Baker filed a charge with the EEOC,
complaining that his discharge violated
the Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA"), and on September 9,
1996, the EEOC filed this enforcement
action in its own name against Waffle
House pursuant to S 107(a) of the ADA,
42 U.S.C § 12117(a), and 5 102 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C 5
1981a, alleging that Waffle House had
engaged in "unlawful employment
practices at its West Columbia, South
Carolina, facility" The EEOC stated in
its complaint that its purpose for filing
the suit was "to correct unlawful
employment practices on the basis of
disability and to provide appropriate
relief to Eric Scott Baker, who was
adversely affected by such practices." It
sought as relief (1) a permanent
injunction barring Waffle House from
engaging in employment practices that
discriminate on the basis of disability; (2)
an order that Waffle House institute and
carry out antidiscrimination policies,
practices, and programs to create
opportunities and to eradicate the effects
of past and present discrimination on the
basis of disability (3) backpay and
reinstatement for Baker; (4)
compensation for pecuniary and non-
pecuniary losses suffered by Baker, and
(5) punitive damages.
In response to the complaint, Waffle
House filed a petition under the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C 5 1 et
sa., to compel arbitration and to stay the
litigation and, alternatively, to dismiss the
action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion was
referred to a magistrate judge who--
relying on the undisputed record
consisting of the complaint, answers to
interrogatories, and affidavits filed in
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connection with the motion to compel
arbitration--recommended to the district
court that it conclude that Baker had
entered into an arbitration agreement
with Waffle House and that the EEOC
was required to arbitrate the claims it
filed on behalf of Baker. The district
court, relying on the facts "extrapolated
from the pleadings," disagreed with the
magistrate judge's recommendations and
denied each of Waffle House's motions,
concluding that the arbitration provision
contained in Baker's employment
application was inapplicable because the
West Columbia Waffle House facility,
which ultimately hired Baker, had not
hired him pursuant to his earlier
application submitted at the Columbia
Waffle House facility.
Waffle House filed this interlocutory
appeal challenging the district court's
denial of its petition to compel
arbitration and to stay proceedings. Se? 9
U.S.C. 5 16(a)(1). On appeal, it argues
that (1) contrary to the district court's
holding, a valid, enforceable arbitration
agreement existed between Baker and
Waffle House and (2) its motion to
compel arbitration under 5 4 of the FAA
should be granted because the arbitration
agreement between Baker and Waffle
House binds the EEOC to "assert
Baker's claim in an arbitral forunm."
II
Because arbitration is a matter of
contract, we must first determine
whether an enforceable arbitration
agreement governed Baker's employment
with Waffle House. S? Jobrson v Cimat
City Stats, Inc, 148 F.3d 373, 377 (4th
Cir.1998). The district court concluded
that the arbitration agreement in Baker's
employment application did not govern
his employment relationship with Waffle
House because it was submitted to the
Waffle House facility at exit 113 of
Interstate 26 in Columbia, and Baker was
not ultimately employed at that facility.
When Baker later went to the Waffle
House facility at exit 110 of Interstate 26
in West Columbia, he was given a job
there without submitting another
application. The court thus concluded,
"it does not appear that Baker's
acceptance of employment at the West
Columbia Waffle House was made
pursuant to the written application which
included the agreement to arbitrate."
We disagree with the district court's
analysis because it assumes that the two
Waffle House facilities were legally
distinct entities in this context. The
employment application Baker
completed was the standard form
application for employment with the
corporation Waffle House, Inc., and not
with an individual Waffle House facility.
Indeed, the manager at the Columbia
Waffle House facility referred Baker to
the manager at the West Columbia
Waffle House facility. In filling out the
application, Baker left blank the space
provided on the form for listing specific
positions applied for, and he specified no
intent to limit the application to a
particular location. Moreover, when
Baker did begin work at the West
Columbia facility, he did not fill out
another application. It cannot be
assumed that a national corporation like
Waffle House hired an individual
without gathering any of the requisite
information, such as his proper name,
address, social security number, age and
other personal data, qualifications, and
references, all of which were contained
in the application Baker originally
submitted at the Waffle House facility in
Columbia.
Accordingly, the fact that Baker was
ultimately employed at a different facility
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than the one at which he was physically
present when he completed the
application is immaterial to the
applicability of the arbitration agreement.
The generic, corporation-wide
employment application completed and
signed by Baker, and the arbitration
provision it contained, followed Baker to
whichever facility of Waffle House hired
him. We thus conclude that Baker's
application, when accepted by Waffle
House, did form a binding arbitration
agreement between Baker and Waffle
House.
Having reached that conclusion,
however, we must still determine what
effect, if any, the binding arbitration
agreement between Baker and Waffle
House has on the EEOC, which filed
this action in its own name both in the
public interest and on behalf of Baker.
III
In its motion to compel arbitration,
Waffle House sought "to enforce the
arbitration agreement between Waffle
House and Baker and compel the
EEOC, on behalf of Baker, to submit
Baker's employment related dispute with
Waffle House to arbitration." On appeal,
it continues to maintain that "[i]t is of no
consequence under the FAA that the
EEOC is bringing this action on behalf
of Baker rather than Baker bringing this
action directly" because the EEOC is
"bound by Baker's arbitration agreement
with Waffle House." The EEOC
characterizes Waffle House's argument
as "an astounding proposition." It argues
that not only did it "never agree[ ] to
arbitrate its statutory claim," but also that
the EEOC "has independent statutory
authority to bring suit in any federal
district court where venue is proper." We
agree with the EEOC
In enforcing the federal
antidiscrimination laws, the EEOC does
not act merely as a proxy for the
charging party but rather seeks to
"advance the public interest in
preventing and remedying employment
discrimination." Geral Td Ca td
Nornhat, Inc v EEOQ 446 U.S. 318,
331, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319
(1980). The EEOC's independent
authority to enforce the ADA is clear.
In enacting the ADA, Congress chose to
incorporate the enforcement "powers,
remedies, and procedures" of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42
U.S.C 5 12117(a) (incorporating by
reference 42 U.S.C % 2000e-4, -5, -6, -8,
-9). These Title VII mechanisms vest the
EEOC with broad authority to enforce,
in federal court, the statute's ban on
disability-based discrimination. Se 42
U.S.C 5 2000e-5(f)(1), (f)(3). Under Title
VII as originally enacted, the EEOCs
powers were limited to investigation and
conciliation, and Congress relied
exclusively on private parties' suits for
enforcement. In 1972, however, seeking
to remedy widespread noncompliance
under this enforcement system, Congress
amended Title VII, according the EEOC
the right to file suit in federal court in its
own name to eradicate discriminatory
employment practices. Se Ger7ral Td,
446 U.S. at 325-26, 100 S.Q. 1698.
Although the amendments created a dual
system of private and government
enforcement, we have long recognized
that "it was clear that Congress intended
by these [1972] Amendments to place
primary reliance upon the powers of
enforcement to be conferred upon the
Commission ... and not upon private law
suits, to achieve equal employment
opportunity." EEOC v Gxral Elea Ca,
532 F.2d 359, 373 (4th Cir.1976)(internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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Because of this public mission, the
EEOC cannot be viewed as merely an
institutional surrogate for individual
victims of discrimination. See Geeral Td,
446 U.S. at 326, 100 S.Ct. 1698 (holding
that "the EEOC's enforcement suits
should not be considered representative
actions subject to Rule 23"). "[U]nlike
the individual charging party, the EEOC
[sues] 'to vindicate the public interest' as
expressed in the Congressional purpose
of eliminating employment
discrimination as a national evil rather
than for the redress of the strictly private
interests of the complaining party."
Gerral Elec, 532 F.2d at 373 (quoting
EEOCv KeidyCak Cop., 511 F.2d
1352, 1361 (6th Cir.1975)); swalsoEEOC
v Harns riemi4 Inc, 10 F.3d 1286, 1291
(7th Cir.1993) (concluding that because
the EEOCs "interests are broader than
those of the individuals injured by
discrimination ... private litigants cannot
adequately represent the government's
interest in enforcing the prohibitions of
federal statutes" (citations omitted));
EEOC v US. Steel Cop., 921 F.2d 489,
496 (3d Cir.1990) (observing that
"[p]rivate litigation in which the EEOC
is not a party cannot preclude the EEOC
from maintaining its own action because
private litigants are not vested with the
authority to represent the EEOC'(citations omitted)); EEOC u Unital
Pande Seru, 860 F.2d 372 (10th Cir.1988);
EEOC v Godyar A paue Corp., 813
F.2d 1539 (9th Cir.1987).
The statutory structure of Title VII's
enforcement remedies (and therefore
those of the ADA) reflects the notion
that the scope of the public interest
exceeds that of the individual's interest.
In order to preserve the EEOCs
authority to litigate selectively those
cases which it believes will have the most
significant public impact, a charging
party "may not proceed to federal district
court until ... the EEOC has made its
own determination as to the validity of
complainant's claim and issued a right-
to-sue letter." Davis v Nonh Cathru
Dep't <f Cortaba, 48 F.3d 134, 138 (4th
Cir.1995). And if the EEOC chooses to
file suit, the charging party may not bring
his own suit; his right is then limited to
intervening in the EEOC's suit. See 42
U.S.C 5 2000e-5(f)(1). In a similar vein,
when a private individual brings suit, the
court may, under certain circumstances,
permit the EEOC to intervene to protect
the national interest. Se id In addition,
once the EEOC decides to sue in its
own name, it is not limited to the facts
presented in the charge. Rather, the
EEOC may sue based on "[a]ny
violations that [it] ascertains in the
course of a reasonable investigation of
the charging party's complaint." Gerral
Td, 446 U.S. at 331, 100 S.Ct. 1698; see
also Gerul Ela, 532 F.2d at 370. Finally,
the EEOC's independent interest is also
reflected in the fact that a charging party
may not withdraw his charge without the
consent of the EEOC Sw 29 CF.R 
1601.10.
Even while empowering the EEOC to
sue on a charge independently, Congress
preserved the individual's private
remedies under Title VII, indicating that
pnvate suits are still appropriate to
redress individuals' grievances. And even
when the EEOC has determined to
bring suit in its own name, the charging
party retains "the right to intervene in a
civil action brought by the Commission"
if the individual believes that the EEOC
will not adequately represent his interests
as it pursues its public objectives. Se 42
U.S.C § 2000e-5(f)(1); arrym 29 U.S.C
§ 62 6(c)(1) (terminating an individual's
right to sue under the ADEA upon the
EEOCs commencement of an action to
enforce that individual's rights).
Congress anticipated that the EEOC
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would not always be able to achieve the
best possible result for each individual
while at the same time pursuing its
mission to vindicate the public interest.
Sw Gereral Td, 446 U.S. at 331, 100 S.Ct.
1698 (noting that the EEOC "is
authorized to ... obtain the most
satisfactory overall relief even though
competing interests are involved" and
that it must make "the hard choices
where conflicts of interest exist").
In short, under the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, which are incorporated into
the ADA, Congress has created a dual
enforcement system, reflecting the
notion that the EEOC and the charging
party are not interchangeable plaintiffs.
Each has its own distinct, albeit
overlapping, interests for which
overlapping remedies are provided.
Thus, in pursuing the inquiry into
whether the EEOC can be compelled to
arbitrate on the basis of an arbitration
agreement binding the charging party, we
do not take the EEOC as a surrogate for
the charging party, subrogated to his
interest. Rather, we examine the related,
but independent, interests of both the
EEOC and the charging party to
determine how an arbitration agreement
signed by the charging party affects the
prosecution of a claim by the EEOC
First, we must recognize that neither the
ADA nor Title VII as incorporated
therein requires the EEOC to arbitrate.
On the contrary, as demonstrated above,
the 1972 amendments to Title VII clearly
show that Congress intended that the
EEOC vindicate the public interest by
conciliation and then by suit in federal
court. We must also recognize that in
this case the EEOC is not a party to any
arbitration agreement. Sw AT & T
Tahkdogi, Irr u Canrwocatt Wokes
(fAm, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49, 106 S.Ct.
1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986); Arrants v
Bude, 130 F.3d 636, 640 (4th Cir.1997)
(explaining that "[e]ven though
arbitration has a favored place, there still
must be an underlying agreement
between the parties to arbitrate" (citation
omitted)). Thus, the only argument
Waffle House could advance to require
the EEOC to arbitrate is that the
EEOC's interest in enforcing the ADA is
derivative of Baker's interest. This
argument, however, disregards the
EEOC's independent statutory role as
we have outlined it.
In addition, contrary to Waffle House's
claims, neither of the other two circuits
that have addressed the question of the
impact of a private arbitration agreement
on the EEOC's ability to sue in its own
name have concluded that such an
agreement permits a court to force the
EEOC into arbitration under the FAA.
Sw Frank 's Nosery 177 F.3d at 462
(observing that "courts may not treat the
agreement of a private party to arbitrate
her action as the agreement of the
EEOC to arbitrate its action"); Kidder,
Pasha4 156 F.3d at 301-02 (upholding
the district court's grant of the
employer's motion to dismiss the
EEOC's ADEA suit seeking solely
monetary damages but not addressing
the issue of compelling the EEOC to
arbitrate because the employer did not
seek to do so).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized implicitly that the EEOC,
acting in its public role, is not bound by
private arbitration agreements. Se Gilnrr
v Interstate'robcsn Lare Carp., 500 U.S.
20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26
(1991) (holding that an employee's
private arbitration agreement with her
employer precluded her from filing suit
against the employer under the ADEA).
Although a private arbitration agreement
does bar an individual ADEA claimant
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from asserting her claim in court, it does
nix prevent her from filing a charge with
the EEOC. See id at 28, 111 S.Ct. 1647.
This rule demonstrates the Court's
recognition that the EEOC's suit can
accomplish aims-- namely, combating
discrimination on a societal level--that an
individual's suit is not equipped, nor
perhaps intended, to accomplish. The
court also emphasized, in refuting the
argument that enforcing arbitration
agreements would undercut the statutory
scheme, that "it should be remembered
that arbitration agreements will not
preclude the EEOC from bringing
actions seeking class-wide and equitable
relief." Id at 32, 111 S.Ct. 1647. Thus, it
is apparent that the Court did not intend
that when an individual who is subject to
an arbitration agreement files a charge,
the EEOC can only pursue relief in an
arbitral forum. To the contrary, the
Court appears to have contemplated that
arbitration agreements between charging
parties and their employers would not
infringe on the EEOC's statutory '812
duty to enforce the antidiscrimination
laws in anat
Accordingly, we conclude that Waffle
House cannot succeed on its motion to
compel the EEOC to arbitrate.
IV
While we have thus observed that the
important role of the EEOC in
vindicating the public interest in
preventing and eradicating workplace
discrimination is not to be restricted by
arbitration agreements to which it is not
a party, its role in vindicating in federal
court the individual interests of the
charging party implicates the competing
federal policy favoring the enforcement
of arbitration agreements.
When an individual and an employer
agree to submit employment disputes to
arbitration, it is the federal policy to give
that contract effect in oner to favor the
arbitration mechanism for dispute
resolution. See 9 U.S.C. S 2; Mcsf H. Cn
Mem'L HOSp. v Memay Orstr Cop., 460
U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765
(1983). To permit the EEOC to
prosecute in court Baker's individual
claim--the resolution of which he had
earlier committed by contract to the
arbitral forum--would significantly
trample this strong policy favoring
arbitration. Because Baker's own suit in
court to enforce his ADA claim would
be barred by his contract and by the
federal policy embodied in the FAA,
only a stronger, competing policy could
justify allowing the EEOC to do for
Baker what Baker could not have done
himself. The EEOCs public mission to
eradicate and to prevent discrimination
may be such a policy in certain contexts,
see Gilnr, 500 U.S. at 28, 111 S.Ct. 1647,
but, as we conclude herein, it cannot
outweigh the policy favoring arbitration
when the EEOC seeks relief specific to
the charging party who assented to
arbitrate his claims. Although the EEOC
acts in the public interest, even when
enforcing only the charging party's claim,
cf Allarmle Paper Ca v Moed 422 U.S.
405, 417-18, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d
280 (1975), the public interest aspect of
such a claim is less significant than an
EEOC suit seeking large-scale injunctive
relief to attack discrimination more
generally.
Recognizing these competing policies,
we agree with the balance struck by the
Second Circuit, which held that although
the EEOC "may seek injunctive relief in
the federal forum for employees even
when those employees have entered into
binding arbitration agreements," it may
not pursue relief in court--in that case,
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monetary relief--specific to individuals
who have waived their right to a judicial
forum by signing an arbitration
agreement. Kidder, Peazdy, 156 F.3d at
302-03; but se Frank's Nursery 177 F.3d
at 459-67 (holding that neither the FAA
nor principles of preclusion or waiver
could operate to bar the EEOC from
seeking monetary relief on behalf of
aggrieved individuals). When the EEOC
seeks "make-whole" relief for a charging
party, the federal policy favoring
enforcement of private arbitration
agreements outweighs the EEOCs right
to proceed in federal court because in
that circumstance, the EEOC's public
interest is minimal, as the EEOC seeks
primarily to vindicate private, rather than
public, interests. On the other hand,
when the EEOC is pursuing large-scale
injunctive relief, the balance tips in favor
of EEOC enforcement efforts in federal
court because the public interest
dominates the EEOC's action.
Thus, we hold that to the extent that the
EEOC seeks "a permanent injunction
enjoining [Waffle House] from
discharging individuals and engaging in
any other employment practice which
discriminates on the basis of disability"
and an order to Waffle House "to
institute and carry out policies, practices,
and programs which provide equal
employment opportunities for qualified
individuals with disabilities, and which
eradicate the effects of its past and
present unlawful employment practices,"
the EEOC is pursuing the public interest
in a discrimination-free workplace, and it
must be allowed to do so in federal
court, as authorized by the ADA,
notwithstanding the charging party's
agreement to arbitrate. In seeking to
"vindicate rights belonging to the United
States as sovereign," EEOC v Goodyar
Aeratpax Cop., 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th
Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), which are not
necessarily identical to the interests of
the individual charging party, the
EEOC's course of conduct should not
be -affected by the actions of an
individual in entering into a private
arbitration agreement. See Part III, supra.
In similar contexts where charging
parties have been deprived of their right
to sue either by settling their claims or
having their claims dismissed, courts
have nevertheless permitted the EEOC
to maintain a suit for injunctive relief.
Sae eg, EEOC v Massey Yany Chrsler
Plymah, Ina, 117 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th
Cir.1997) (noting that "there would be
little point in [the EEOC] having the
independent power to sue if it could not
obtain relief beyond that fashioned for
the individual claimant"); EECv Haris
Chrni& Inc, 10 F.3d 1286, 1291-92 (7th
Cir.1993); GoodyarAertpac, 813 F.2d at
1542-45.
Conversely, however, in these same
contexts some of the same courts have
recognized that a charging partys actions
that impede his own right to sue can also
circumscribe the contours of the
EEOC's suit in its own name to the
extent that it acts on behalf of the
charging party. See eg, Goodywr
Aenpae, 813 F.2d at 1543 (holding that
the charging party's acceptance of a
personal settlement of her claims
rendered moot the EEOCs claims for
backpay on her behalf); EEOC v US.
Stal Coap., 921 F.2d 489, 496 (3d
Cir.1990) (holding that the doctrine of usjudiata barred the EEOC from seeking
"individualized benefits" under the
ADEA on behalf of individuals whose
own suits were unsuccessful because the
EEOC was "in privity" with those
individuals); Harris Cbxrni 10 F.3d at
1291 (following US. Stel 's reasoning
with regard to the EEOCs claim for
backpay, liquidated damages, and
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reinstatement for an individual whose
suit was dismissed as barred by the
statute of limitations).
Similarly, we also hold that when the
EEOC enforces the individual rights of
Baker by seeking backpay, reinstatement,
and compensatory and punitive damages,
it must recognize Baker's prior
agreement to adjudicate those rights in
the arbitral forum. Because the EEOC
maintains that it "has no intention" of
pursuing a claim in arbitration, we do not
reach the question of whether the
EEOC is authoiza to do so. But it
cannot pursue Baker's individual
remedies in court, although it may seek
broad injunctive relief in its public
enforcement role.
Accordingly, we affirm the district
court's order to the extent that it denied
Waffle House's motions to compel the
EEOC to arbitrate and to dismiss this
action. We reverse its ruling that the
EEOC may prosecute Baker's individual
claims in court. And we remand with
instructions to the district court to
dismiss, without prejudice, the EEOC's
claims asserted on behalf of Baker
individually and to permit the EEOC to
move forward on its claims for broad
injunctive relief. * * *
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED
IN PART, AND REMANDED
KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
(Deleted)
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High Court Weighs in on Arbitration
Workforce
Friday, June 1, 2001
Gillian Flynn
Mandatory arbitration agreements have
been shaded with doubt for years. The
nagging question: Just how enforceable
are they? In March, the Supreme Court
answered. In Saint Clair Adams v. Circuit
City, the Court ruled that employers may
indeed require employees to bring all
their work-related disputes before an
arbitrator-rather than file a lawsuit. In
short, this major decision allows
employers to establish arbitration
programs as the sole means for
employees to issue complaints-replacing
court action as an option. Larry Lorber, a
partner in the Washington, D.C, office
of Proskauer Rose LLP-and
the author of the amicus brief in the case
on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce-
explains the case and its fallout for
employers.
What Is the crux of Saint (lair Adams v.
circuit City?
Adams was hired by Circuit City, and
signed an arbitration agreement. He
complained to his supervisors of being
harassed because he was gay. He claimed
not only that there was no response,
but also that his managers belittled his
complaints and encouraged the
harassment. He resigned and filed a
California state cause of action.
And the case reached the Supreme Court.
What was the nature of the justices'
ruling?
In a 5 to 4 decision, the justices argued
that they want these cases to go to
arbitration. The Supreme Court is very
pro-arbitration, partly because the courts
are getting inundated with similar lawsuits.
How will this
complaints?
ruling affect EEOC
There will be an arbitration case-EEOC v
Waffle House-- next term deciding this
question. The issue is whether an
employee's agreement to arbitrate would
prohibit the EEOC from filing a lawsuit
on the employee's behalf [The fourth
circuit court held that the EEOC can
pursue injunctive relief, but not monetary
relief, for an individual who'd signed an
arbitration agreement.]
So this is a decision with major
implications, but a lot of loose ends, right?
This whole issue isn't over. The Supreme
Court only answered the basic question.
They simply said, yes, mandatory
arbitration agreements and pre-
employment arbitration agreements will
be enforceable. And that will trump any
state law. But whether employees have to
pay part of the arbitration cost, whether
their remedies can be limited, whether
they get damages-all those issues
are still floating around. The Supreme
Court answered the most narrow question
it had to-but it didn't answer all the others.
Where does that leave us? Can employers,for instance, have an agreement that says
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no matter what the claim, race or sex
discrimination, the employee has to go
through mandatory arbitration?
Yes. That you can do. But there's the
issue: do you make the employee pay for
the cost of the arbitrator? There's a case
out of Washington, D.C., where the
circuit court said no, you can't, because if
you do that, you're placing a burden on
the employee that the employee wouldn't
otherwise have if the complaint went to
court.
Other courts have said you can charge
employees something, [similar to] filing
fees. So a lot of these circuit courts have
established parameters.
What should a legally defensible
agreement look like in light of the
Supreme Court's decision?
Employers should look at protocols
written by the American Arbitration
Association and the American Bar
Association explaining what they would
allow as employment arbitration. But
these agreements should allow for some
degree of discovery, and damages. You
can't have punitive damages in arbitration-
that's something only a court could order.
So the damages may not be at the same
level as you'd get in court, but some
degree of damages is probably required.
What about class actions? What happens
there?
There are questions as to whether you can
have class-action arbitration. I don't think
you can. But that will be a question,
because by definition arbitrations are
individual complaints. So how do you
bring a class action if the individuals don't
all go through the arbitration process of
filing and undergoing some degree of
mediation? I don't think it's a matter of
law that you have to have class actions-
that's created by litigation rules and
procedure.
Can employers say in the agreement that
employees can't file a complaint with
EEOC2
Absolutely not-that you can't do. You
can't prevent anybody from going to the
EEOC or filing a charge with the EEOC.
That's what this Waffle House case is
about: what happens if they do file with
the EEOC? That's a right employees can't
waive. Just as in some settlement
agreements, employers can't say, "You
can't complain to the EEOC." But what
you can say is, "You can't benefit. If you
take our money, you can't benefit from
the EEOC" So you can't prevent
employees from filing a charge. But this
Waffle House case may say that if an
employee has signed an arbitration
agreement, he or she may file a charge,
but it doesn't mean anything.
What else should agreements include right
now?
The arbitration agreement should be
accessible to employees. It shouldn't be
designed in a way that by either cost or
process, it's going to inhibit employees in
being able to bring a claim. Employees
should be allowed to be represented. In
fact, they have to be allowed to be
represented. There's a question then-
should the arbitration agreement provide
for some attorneys' fees? I'd think the
answer is yes. I know there have been
some arbitration agreements that provide
for attorneys' fees-not unlimited, but
attomeys'fees.
How should arbitrators be decided?
The agreement should provide for a
degree of fairness as to who the arbitrator
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is. You don't want to have a closed panel
of arbitrators who are arguably dependent
on the employer for their business. Go
through the American Arbitration
Association or any of these independent
arbitration outfits. At least have a wide-
open panel, allowing the employee and
employer-as they do in union contests-to
choose an arbitrator.
What else should an agreement allow for?
Provide some degree of discovery. In my
own view, not anything like federal
discovery, which is simply a boon for
lawyers-it costs everybody a fortune, but
for no particular benefit. Have written
opinions. And have, prior to arbitration,
some form of dispute-resolution
mechanism. A fair disputeresolution
component will help the process do what
it's supposed to do: resolve these matters
quickly.
Copyright @ 2001 ProQuest
Information and Learning. All rights
reserved.
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Court to Review Federal Litigation of Arbitrated Cases
Business Insumnce
Monday, April 9, 2001
Mark A. Hoffman
How the Supreme Court decides an
employment arbitration case that the
justices recently accepted for review
could mean that an employer might end
up having to both arbitrate and litigate
the same dispute.
In fact, both employers and the federal
government have a considerable stake in
the outcome of Equal Opportunity
Commission vs. Waffle House Inc.,
employment law experts say. A decision
allowing govermment enforcement
agencies to collect monetary damages on
behalf of victims of discrimination,
regardless of any arbitration provisions in
an employment agreement, could increase
employer costs and discourage the use of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
But a decision banning such damages
could cut into the EEOCs effectiveness
in enforcing anti-discrimination law.
At issue is whether the EEOC can seek
monetary damages on behalf of an
individual who had signed an employment
agreement requiring that job-related
disputes be settled through binding
arbitration (BI, April 2). The justices
decided to hear the case in the aftearmth
of their split decision in Circuit City vs.
Saint (lair Adams. In that March 21
decision, the justices ruled 5-4 that the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 could
apply to most forms of employment and,
thus, allow employers to require
employees who had signed arbitration
agreements to resolve employment- related
grievances through arbitration rather than
litigation (BI, March 26).
Employers had feared that the high court
would follow the lead of the 9' U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals and, for all
practical intent, ban the use of binding
arbitration through a broad reading of the
arbitration act's exemption from the
arbitration requirements of workers
involved in interstate or international
commerce. Following the March 21
decision, employers breathed a collective
sigh of relief and declared victory.
But the Circuit City decision left
unanswered some questions concerning
the use of arbitration agreements that the
high court's review of EEOC v. Waffle
House should help to answer.
The case began in 1994, when Eric Scott
Baker filled out an employment
application that included an arbitration
agreement at a Waffle House restaurant in
Columbia, S.C.; Mr. Baker then accepted a
job at a restaurant in neighboring West
Columbia, S.C, without filling out a new
application.
Mr. Baker suffered from seizures and was
eventually fired. He did not seek
arbitration but filed a complaint with the
EEOQ holding that his dismissal violated
the Americans with Disabilities Act.
A U.S. district court agreed that the
arbitration agreement did not block the
EEOCs pursuit of monetary damages on
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Mr. Baker's behalf. But a three-judge
panel of the 4' U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled 2-1 on Oct. 6, 1999, that,
while it could seek injunctive relief for Mr.
Baker, the EEOC could not seek
monetary compensation, including
punitive damages. The EEOC appealed
to the Supreme Court, which agreed late
last month to hear the case.
The high court's decision will help
determine exactly how valuable
employment arbitration agreements are
when the federal government gets
involved.
"I'm not surprised at all by the decision of
the appeals court in Waffle House or the
Supreme Court taking the case. It's an
area that does need clarification," said
Chuck Freeman, a partner in the Chicago
law firm of Gardner, Carton, and
Douglas.
"There's a split in the circuits, but the
prevailing view is that the employee
waives his individual rights but the federal
government retains the right to bring
enforcement actions seeking either
classwide or other forms of equitable
relief," Mr. Freeman said.
"The reality is arbitration, both before and
after this Waffle House decision, was
never a complete insulator from
employment-related litigation. What you
have here is a situation where an
employee, by signing an arbitration
agreement, has given up his or her claims
against an employer, but clearly, that
employee was never in a position to
effectively waive whatever other
enforcement rights that an agency like the
EEOC or National Labor Relations Board
or even the Department of Labor
enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act
might otherwise retain," Mr. Freeman
said.
"Can the EEOC do for the charging party
that which the charging party cannot do
for him- or herself? A charging party may
be an employee, may be a former
employee, may be an applicant for
employment," said Charles Edwards,
partner and head of the labor and
employment practice in the Raleigh, N.C,
office of the Winston-Salem, N.C.-based
law firm of Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge, &
Rice.
"That principle would apply with equal
force to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and, arguably, to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act," Mr.
Edwards said.
"The principle is quite important, because
employers enter into arbitration
agreements with an eye toward
eliminating, or, at least, substantially
reducing their costs of litigation," Mr.
Edwards said. "But if they have to both
arbitrate with the employee and litigate
with the EEOC, they have not only not
reduced their costs-they've multiplied
them. Then what happens if the
arbitrator comes out one way for the
charging party and the court comes out
the other way in the EEOC suit? Which
result trumps the other?" Mr. Edwards
asked.
"A lot of complaints relating to
employment discrimination have that
dual-remedy possibility," said Quentin
Riegel, deputy general counsel of the
National Assn. Of Manufacturers in
Washington. "Any company that has an
arbitration provision will want some
assurance that the arbitration provision is
effective and is exclusive. If the EEOC
can go on a separate track, that reduces
the benefit of the arbitration agreement.
So it makes extra work to resolve disputes,
it's not efficient and it provides remedies
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that the employer and employee may not
have agreed upon," he said.
The government has quite a lot riding on
the outcome of the case, said Gerald L.
Maatman, Jr., senior partner and
chairman-global employment, law practice
at the Chicago law firm of Baker &
McKenzie.
"I think a lot is at stake when the decision
will be made, and it's coupled with the
recent holding in Circuit City. It could
win cases that make or break the EEOC's
enforcement plan, because a decision
adverse to the commission could
significantly impact its ability to obtain
wide-ranging monetary settlements and
verdicts in class-action situations," Mr.
Maatman said.
An additional factor in the case is the
nature of the EEOC itself, Mr. Edwards
said.
"Another reason this is significant is (that)
unlike the National Labor Relations
Board, the EEOC is totally resistant to
ADR procedures that would keep them
from going to court," he said. "EEOC, as
a government agency with, at least
theoretically, unlimited resources, can, in
effect, force a settlement by virtue of their
power, which means that an employer
may very well cave in rather than asserting
its rights in multiple forums."
Copyright Q 2001 Crain
Communications, Inc.
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Arbitration's Rise Raises Fairness Issue
What Happens When Workers Give Up the Right to Sue?
In Some Cases, Bankruptcy?
USA Today
Tuesday, June 12,2001
Stephanie Armour
When Sherri Warner claimed a former
employer sexually harassed her, the
California secretary had to abide by a
legal agreement requiring any claims go
to arbitration instead of court.
Warner lost her arbitration case, but that
was just the beginning of her problems.
Warner's lawyer says she was then
required to pay her former boss's legal
fees. After 3 years of hearings, the total
bill came to more than $200,000 --
enough, he says, to force her into personal
bankruptcy.
Arbitration is supposed to be a swift,
inexpensive and less adversarial way to
settle workplace disputes. But as more
companies make arbitration mandatory,
cntics are claiming the process is rife
with problems.
Instead of it being fast, employees
undergoing arbitration have sometimes
waited months or years for a resolution.
Instead of it being cheaper than lawsuits,
some employees have faced such steep
arbitration fees that they've declared
bankruptcy, while others have had to pay
thousands of dollars even after winning a
claim.
And there are complaints about the
arbitration process. Some employees have
had to sign contracts giving employers
sole discretion in picking available
arbitrators. They've been entitled to far
less money than they could have gotten
from a jury. And instead of being able to
appeal, employees have found arbitration
decisions often are final.
"It's awful. You're in a lawless setting, it's
secret, it's stacked with people who are
not your peers," says Neil Mullin, a
lawyer in Montclair, N.J., who has
represented workers in arbitration claims.
"It's about as unfair a system as you could
find."
Proponents of mandatory arbitration say
that the system works and that abuses are
rare. But concerns about the process are
garnering more attention in the wake of a
Supreme Court ruling in March that
basically gave companies the go-ahead to
mandate arbitration. Information on how
many employers require arbitration is
sketchy, but providers of arbitration
services say they're seeing a rise in
business. The American Arbitration
Association reports that it provides
dispute-resolution services to 500
companies covering 5 million employees.
JAMS, another provider, reports a 9% to
10% annual growth in business.
The Supreme Court ruling means workers
can be compelled to go to arbitration
rather than to a jury. Now that millions of
non-union workers can be made to take
sexual harassment, discrimination and
other claims to third-party decision
makers, debate is turning from whether
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arbitration is legal to how to make sure it's
justly enforced.
"Employee groups and unions who had
hoped to block arbitration programs are
instead shifting gears to focus on whether
it's fair. That's where the action is now,"
says Curtis von Kann, a retired judge and
arbitrator in JAMS' Washington office.
"There's increasing focus on how
arbitration is set up and how it works."
Fair to all, or pro-boss?
Under mandatory arbitration, workers
who want to keep or get jobs must sign
legal agreements with their employers
pledging to take disputes to a third-party
decision maker. These arbitrators are
often retired judges who get paid to hear
cases and issue final rulings. Many
companies have been turning to the
practice because it prevents expensive jury
awards and avoids publicity, experts say.
Supporters defend the process as a way to
provide speedy and affordable justice
without clogging up the courts. Abuses
are rare, they say, because workers forced
to sign unfair arbitration agreements can
sue to have those contracts thrown out --
and have successfully done so. Arbitrators
often abide by ethics codes or minimum
standards of fairness designed to make
sure workers get equitable hearings. And
supporters say critics overlook the myriad
employees satisfied with arbitration.
"Arbitration gives resolution to more
employees," says Florence Peterson,
general counsel at the New York-based
American Arbitration Association. "They
get their claims resolved quickly and at a
lower cost."
But as concerns persist, more courts are
examining -- and in some cases
overturning -- arbitration contracts that
workers dispute as too pro-business. What
critics say they're concerned about:
* Burdensome costs. Nothing prevents
employers in some states from drafting
contracts requiring workers to pay all or
part of an arbitrator's wages or filing fees.
That can be costly. Arbitrators may charge
from $200 to $500 or more an hour, with
sessions running from a few days to
several months or longer. Compare that
with filing a civil case in court, critics
say, which often runs less than a couple
hundred dollars.
Some say steep arbitration costs deter
claims. Waffle House grill operator Eric
Baker, hired at $5.50 an hour, was fired
from his job in West Columbia, S.C., after
experiencing a seizure. He claimed he'd
been discriminated against and filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. The EEOC
tried to sue, but courts ruled the EEOC
can't recover damages on Baker's behalf.
The reason? He'd signed an earlier
contract with his company agreeing to
arbitrate disputes. Under that agreement,
Baker would have had to pay for part of
the arbitrator's fee, an amount critics
argued was an unfair financial burden.
He never arbitrated any claims, and the
EEOC's case is still pending. The
Supreme Court is expected to rule next
year on whether the EEOC can legally
recover compensatory, punitive and other
damages for workers already covered by
arbitration clauses.
* Corporate favoritism. Nothing prevents
employers from drafting contracts giving
themselves sole discretion in selecting the
roster of arbitrators used to hear workers'
claims. And employers may use the same
person repeatedly, which some fear will
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pressure umpires- for-hire to rule in
companies' favor.
"If I was picked by the same company
over and over again, would that affect
how I rule?" asks Charles Craver, a law
professor at George Washington
University who specializes in dispute
resolution. "You normally only see the
plaintiff once. These are issues that are
going to have to be addressed."
Some employees have tried. Consider the
case of Annette Phillips. She quit her job
at a Hooters of America franchise in
Myrtle Beach, S.C., after she says a
company official sexually harassed her by
grabbing and slapping her buttocks.
Hooters, however, asked the courts to
make her abide by an arbitration contract
that allowed it to pick the roster of
arbitrators and to change the arbitration
rules. An appeals court in 1999 declined
to force Phillips to abide by the agreement
it called "one-sided." The case is now
resolved, but lawyers for Phillips
declined to comment on any other details.
"The old program was fair," counters
Mike McNeil, a Hooters spokesman,
adding that some changes have been
adopted since the lawsuit. Mandatory
arbitration still is required of employees,he says, because "It's faster, it's fair, it's
cheaper, it's more consistent."
* Undue limitations. Nothing prevents
employers from drafting agreements that
cap the financial awards workers can get
through arbitration. They can limit
punitive damages, which critics saydeprives workers of the heftier
settlements they could get from a jury.And employers may wnte contracts
restricting discovery, or access to
evidence, as well as the taking of witness
testimony.
Some feel such limits can go too far.
Walter Maciejewski, a computer software
development director, had signed an
arbitration provision restricting discovery
and requiring him to pay for part of
his arbitration fees. Nevertheless, he sued
his former employer, Alpha Systems Lab,
for age and race discrimination.
A Southern California appeals court
upheld a lower court's decision not to
require arbitration because the agreement
was "unconscionable." Alpha Systems did
not return calls seeking comment.
Legal experts say such cases are a clear
sign courts are cracking down on
arbitration clauses perceived to be unfair,
but that's where the agreement ends.
Arbitration supporters say such rulings
have led to more equitable agreements,
while critics argue the rulings are an
alarming sign of just how biased
arbitration contracts can be.
Setting fairness standards
Defenders say complaints are rare. That's
because organizations that provide
arbitration services typically require
companies to play fair, they say.
They get them to do this by making sure
companies follow certain fairness
standards. The standards may include
providing both parties with written
explanations of arbitrators' decisions.
They may allow workers to recover all the
money that would have been available to
them if they'd been able to go to court.
They may allow for discovery, depositions
and employees'input in selecting who will
arbitrate the case.
And they may also limit how much
workers have to pay. Companies that dobusiness with the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), for example, generally
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can't make their employees pay more than
$500 in filing fees and half of the
arbitrator's cost. While that can still be
expensive, arbitration's supporters say it's
still less costly than a drawn-out lawsuit.
They also say arbitration can actually put
employers at a disadvantage, because
workers may be more likely to come
forward with a claim because they don't
need to hire a lawyer.
"The average employee who doesn't have
a big-bucks case is going to find it hard to
find a lawyer who will litigate a claim.
What that means is that smaller cases can't
get attorneys, so this is an advantage for
them," says Peterson of the AAA.
The debate over arbitration's fairness is
only expected to intensify as the practice
grows. Supporters say arbitration is
coming into vogue because it works so
well.
Workers like St. (lair Adams disagree. He
brought harassment charges against his
former company, a Circuit City store in
Santa Rosa, Calif., which sued to make
him abide by arbitration. The Supreme
Court upheld the company's right to
enforce that arbitration in a precedent-
setting case this year.
"There should be a uniform set of laws
for arbitration that are the same as in the
courts," says Adams of San Diego.
"It's an unequal and unfair system. The
rules in arbitration are pro-corporation,
and it seriously violates the U.S.
Constitution. You have a guaranteed right
to a jury of your peers, and that's been
taken away."
Copyright C 2001 USA Today.
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00- 1089 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams
Ruling Below (6' Cir., 224 F.3d 840, 10 A.D. Cas. 1700):
Employee whose impairments- carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis in her hands, arms,
and shoulders- substantially limit her ability to perform range of manual tasks on her
assembly line job, which requires her to grip tool and to keep her arms overhead or at
shoulder level repetitively for extended periods of time, suffers from actual impairment that
substantially limits major life activity and is thus disabled within meaning of Americans with
Disabilities Act.
Question Presented: Did Sixth Circuit correctly hold- in conflict with established rule in
other circuits- that impairment precluding individual from performing only limited number
of tasks associated with specific job qualified as disability under Americans with Disabilities
Act?
Ella WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACrURING, KENTUCKY, INC, Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Decided August 29, 2000
MERRITT, Circuit Judge.
In this case under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C §
12101, et sa., plaintiff Ella Wlliams was
transferred by the defendant auto
manufacturer to the paint inspection
section of the defendant's quality control
operation in its Kentucky assembly plant
because the manual tasks Williams had
been performing on the assembly line
using pneumatic tools had caused her to
develop carpal tunnel syndrome and
tendinitis in her hands and arms.
Williams then spent approximately three
years inspecting cars on the assembly line
for defective paint and manually wiping
down each newly painted car as it passed
on the conveyor. Taking the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, as
we must when the district court has
granted summary judgment for the
defendant-employer, Williams' job duties
were then expanded to include another
job in the paint inspection section
requiring her to grip a block of wood
with a sponge attached to the end and
wipe down the passing cars with a
highlight oil at the rate of approximately
one car per minute. In addition to
gripping the block of wood, this new
work required Williams to keep her
hands and arms up around shoulder
height repetitively over several hours.
Her ligament and muscle problems
reappeared in a more severe form as a
result of the new job, with tendinitis nowin her shoulders and neck as well. As a
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result, Williams asked her employer to
assign her back to her former jobs within
the paint inspection section. The
employer refused according to Williams,
but the employer disputes this fact. The
central question in this case is whether
the employer violated the ADA by
refusing to accommodate Williams by
allowing her to return to her former, less
strenuous work within paint inspection.
The district court granted summary
judgment against the plaintiff primarily
on the ground that she does not have a
"disability," as defined in the Act, and
therefore is not covered by the Act. The
key issue before us is simply whether
plaintiff's physical difficulties in using
her hands, arms and shoulders, as
required by her new job within paint
inspection, constitute a "disability." In
other words, should Williams' inability to
perform certain manual tasks bring her
within the coverage of the Act. Williams
also claims that the defendant violated
the ADA by terminating her due to her
disability. The district court found that
Williams failed to make a prima facie
case with respect to her wrongful
termination claim, because Williams was
completely restricted from doing any
kind of work at the time of her
termination and therefore could not be a
qualified individual under the ADA-
The ADA is unclear as to when it should
be applied to protect an employee, as the
Supreme Court recently suggested in
Sutton v Unita A ir Lim, In, 527 U.S.
471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450
(1999). The Act provides that the
employer may not "discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability ... in regard to ...
hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employees compensation, job
training, and other terms ... of
employment." § 12112(a). The phrase
"qualified individual with a disability' is
defined as a person "with a disability
who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or
desires." § 12111(8). In the crucial
section in the litigation before us, the
Act defines the word "disability" as
follows:
(A) A physical or mental impairment that
substartially lists or or nne q tde myjor 1fe
aainties of such individual;
(B) A record of such impairment; or
(C) Being regarded as having such an
impairment.
S 12102(2) (emphasis added).
The EEOC in its regulations interpreting
the ADA and the Supreme Court in
Sutton have said that the language in the
definition of disability that the
impairment in question must
"substantially limit[ ] one or more of the
major life activities" requires for the
major life activity of "working" that the
individual be unable to perform a class
or broad range of jobs. The analysis
must be class based. "One must be
precluded from more than one type of
job," i.e., "a substantial class of jobs."
Suttc 119 S.Ct. at 2151. The plaintiff
here asserts primarily that her
impairments disable her from
performing manual tasks, * * * a
different disability from "working," the
disability at issue in the Sutton case. It
would appear, nevertheless from the
language of the Act, the EEOC's
interpretation and the Supreme Court's
analysis in Sutn that in order to be
disabled the plaintiff must show that her
manual disability involves a "class" of
manual activities affecting the ability to
perform tasks at work.
In this case, taking the evidence in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, we
conclude that the plaintiff's set of
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impairments to her arms, shoulders and
neck are sufficiently disabling to allow
the factfinder to find she crosses the
threshold into the protected class of
individuals under the ADA who must be
accorded reasonable accommodation.
Her ailments are analogous to having
missing, damaged or deformed limbs
that prevent her from doing the tasks
associated with certain types of manual
assembly line jobs, manual product
handling jobs and manual building tradejobs (painting, plumbing, roofing, etc.)
that require the gripping of tools and
repetitive work with hands and arms
extended at or above shoulder levels for
extended periods of time.
The fact that Williams can perform a
range of isolated, non-repetitive manual
tasks performed over a short period of
time, such as tending to her personal
hygiene or carrying out personal or
household chores, does not effect a
determination that her impairment
substantially limits her ability to perform
the range of manual tasks associated with
an assembly line job. In addition, looking
at all of the evidence most favorably to
the plaintiff, the duration of Williams'
impairment, as well as the expected
permanent impact of it, are inferable
from the permanent work restrictions
prescribed by Williams' treating
physicians. As a result, we conclude
there is sufficient evidence to support afinding that Williams was substantially
limited as to a major life activity and that
the district court's grant of summaryjudgment for the defendant was
inappropriate.
Because we conclude that Williams is
substantially limited in performing
manual tasks, we do not need todeternuine whether Williams is
substantially limited as to the major life
activities of lifting or working. Moreover,
as to the major life activity of working,
the case of McKay v Toya Maor Mfg,
US.A., Inc, 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1997),
is distinguishable from the case at hand.
McKay was decided before the Supreme
Court recognized in Siam that "there
may be some conceptual difficulty in
defining 'major life activities' to include
work, for it seems to argue in a circle to
say that if one is excluded, for instance,
by reason of [an impairment, from
working with others] ... then that
exclusion constitutes an impairment,
when the question you're asking is,
whether the exclusion itself is by reason
of handicap." 119 S.C. at 2151 (internal
citation omitted). The Sutton Court
further noted that "even the EEOC has
expressed a reluctance to ... include
working and has suggested that working
be viewed as a residual life activity,
considered, as a last resort, aly 'i]f an
individual is not substantially limited
with respect to any <dxr major life
activity.' " Id (quoting 29 CF.R. pt.
1630, App. 5 1630.2()) (emphasis in
onginal).
In this case, the plaintiff's claim is not
based solely on the difficult concept that
she is disabled as to work generally, but
rather, includes the rather simple
concept that she is disabled as to
performing manual tasks because she
suffers from a severe impairment to her
limbs, shoulders and neck that seriously
reduces her ability to perform the
manual tasks that are job-related.
Ultimately, McKay is distinguishable from
this case for the same reason that Suttm
is, in that these cases only turned on thedifficult concept" of working which is
viewed as a "last resort." The concept of
"manual tasks" requires a disability
analysis to come before the life activity
of working is considered and includeslooking at a person's ability to use theirlimbs in a way called for by a broad
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range or class of manual activities that, as
in this case, require the gripping of tools
and arms to be kept overhead or at
shoulder level repetitively for an
extended period of time. Here, the
impairments of limbs are sufficiently
severe to be like deformed limbs and
such activities affect manual tasks
associated with working, as well as
manual tasks associated with recreation,
household chores and living generally.
The notion of "class" advocated by the
Suiton Court can be based on a more
limited concept than "working," and can
be based on limits on manual activities
which can affect other major life
activities. Moreover, we believe
Williams's impairment is more severe
than the May plaintiff's, rendering
Williams "[s]ignificantly restricted as to
the condition, manner or duration under
which [she] can perform [manual tasks]
as compared to the condition, manner,
or duration under which the average
person in the general population can
perform [them]." 29 C.F.R 5
1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
Because we conclude that Williams has
made the necessary showing under §
12102(2)(A) that she suffers from an
actual impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity to survive a
motion for summary judgment, we need
not address her claims that she was
disabled because she had a record of a
qualifying impairment, pursuant to §
12102(2)(B), or that, in the alternative,
she was disabled because she was
regarded as having such an impairment,
pursuant to § 12102(2)(C). As to
Williams's wrongful termination claim,
however, we agree with the district court
that, because Williams is restricted
completely from working, she cannot
claim to be a "qualified individual with a
disability" within the meaning of the
ADA, therefore, that claim must fail.
Although we have concluded that
Williams is disabled and that there is a
triable issue of fact as to whether the
defendant auto manufacturer failed to
reasonably accommodate her disability, it
is important to note that Williams must
still demonstrate the remainder of her
prima facie case, and that the defendant
is still free to raise any viable defenses as
to why it was unable to accommodate
Williams, such as undue hardship and
business necessity. To the extent that
there is concern that employers may be
required to answer in court "for every
employment practice that draws
distinctions based on physical attributes,"
nothing in this opinion should be
construed to undermine an employer's
ability to rely on an appropriate
affirmative defense. Suwu 119 S.Ct. at
2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In regard to Williams's FMLA claim, we
conclude that the district court properly
granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant. The FMLA entitles an
eligible employee with a serious health
condition to 12 work weeks of unpaid
medical leave, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D),
and if an employee's FMLA rights are
violated, then they are entitled to recover
certain damages. 5 2617. On appeal,
Williams does not dispute the
defendant's claim that, assuming a7uedo
she was improperly denied FMLA leave,
she has suffered no damages. * * *
Williams has pointed to no economic
benefits that she has lost from the denial
of FMLA leave. In fact, Williams offered
no evidence of any damages in her brief
or at oral argument. Moreover, as the
district court noted, Williams testified
that on December 6, 1996, her last day
of work at the assembly plant, she was
placed under a no work of any kind
restriction by one of her doctors and that
she was still under this restriction nearly
rune months after she stopped working
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at the assembly plant. Williams'
contention on appeal that this fact is
actually a matter of dispute is
unpersuasive, as a review of Williams'
deposition transcript reveals that she
unequivocally stated that she was
restricted at the time of her termination
and up until at least nine months later
from doing any work of any kind, not
even office jobs. Even if Williams was
wrongfully terminated on January 27,
1997, within the 12-week period covered
by the FMLA, she has failed to direct
this court to any specific evidence
supporting her claim that she was
mistaken about her work restrictions
when she gave her deposition and that
she could have returned to work
eventually. C Plant v Morn Int'4 In,
212 F.3d 929, 934-36 (6th Cir.2000)
(holding that an employee's inability to
return to work within twelve weeks did
not foreclose his FMLA claim, where he
could have returned to work eventually
and the employer failed to give notice
that his FMLA leave time had begun to
run.) Williams therefore cannot
demonstrate that she was entitled to
reinstatement under S 2617.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district
court's ruling as it pertains to the
plaintiff's ADA claim for failure to
accommodate and REMAND for
further proceedings, but AFFIRM the
district court's ruling on Williams's
FMLA claim and her claim for wrongful
termination.
BOGGS, Circuit Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part. (Deleted)
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High Court to Hear Toyota Disability Case
Automotive News
Monday, April 30,2001
Harry Stoffer
Manufacturers and other employers will
be watching the U.S. Supreme Court
closely to see how the justices rule in a
dispute between Toyota and a former
employee who says assembly line work
disabled her.
The case is considered an important test
of a 1990 law, called the Americans With
Disabilities Act, which was intended to
prevent discrimination against people with
physical or mental impairments.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing North
America, Inc. overcame the daunting odds
that face anyone who asks the high court
to accept a case. It convinced the justices
there ar national issues at stake in its
dispute with ex-worker Ella Williams.
The court, which annually accepts fewer
than 200 of the 7,000 to 8,000 appeals it
receives, agreed April 16 to hear Toyota's
arguments in the next term, which begins
in October.
The National Association of
Manufacturers, representing more than
14,000 employers, has joined the case on
Toyota's side.
The association told the court that a ruling
against Toyota would open the floodgates
to lawsuits against "well-meaning
employers" by people who claim to have
carpal tunnel syndrome and other
repetitive- motion injuries.
Such ailments usually can be treated and
should not be called disabilities, the
manufacturers contended.
Williams went to work for Toyota at its
Georgetown, Ky., plant in 1990, first in
the paint department, then on the engine
manufacturing line, where she used
vibrating pneumatic power tools.
According to court documents, she
developed carpal tunnel syndrome in both
wrists and tendonitis in her arms and
neck. Toyota moved her to quality-
control inspections, where she performed
two of the four jobs in the department
without problems for about three years.
The company later decided everyone in
the department should be trained in all
four jobs.
After Williams was required to wipe new
cars with a finishing oil, at the rate of
about one per minute, her symptoms
returned. She stopped going to work
Toyota terminated her. She filed a federal
lawsuit. A district court ruled for Toyota.
But the 6t Circuit Court of Appeals said
in a July 2000 decision that Williams'
inability to perform some of the manual
tasks associated with an assembly-line job
constitutes a disability. It ordered a trial
on whether the company had done
enough to accommodate Williams'disability.
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Toyota, in its appeal, said the law was
meant to cover people whose disabilities
might keep them from working, not those
who cannot do a particular job.
"As more and more employees develop
isolated repetitive-motion injuries ... the
extent to which employers must offer
costly accommodations to this rapidly
growing segment of the workforce will
assume critical importance," Toyota said
in its petition.
Williams' lawyer, Robert Rosenbaum, told
the justices that Toyota, driven by
"economic motives," seeks to twist the
law and other court precedents. He
wrote: "A person does not have to be
totally disabled before he is entitled to the
protection" of the disabilities law.
Copyright c 2001 Automotive News.
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Court to Decide Scope of Disabilities Act
Repetitive Stress Injuries Will be in the Spotlight When Supreme Court
Hears Case
USA Today
Tuesday, April 17, 2001
Joan Biskupic
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide whether repetitive stress injuries,
which affect millions of workers, merit
protection under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
The case, to be heard in the fall and likely
decided in 2002, will offer the justices
their first look at how the 1990 law
banning discrimination against the
disabled covers carpal tunnel syndrome.
The condition can seriously affect wrist
nerves, but some employers consider it
minor and beyond the scope of the ADA.
The 1990 law covers only those who have
an impairment that substantially limits a
"major life activity." Toyota Motor
Manufacturing of Kentucky is appealing a
lower court decision that sided in part
with a paint inspector who has carpal
tunnel syndrome and tendinitis. Toyota
argues the worker is not sufficiently
impaired by the condition.
Acting in a separate case, the justices also
agreed to decide whether the ADA
requires an employer to accommodate a
disabled worker by reassigning him to a
more manageable position when the move
conflicts with a seniority system. A former
US Airways baggage handler, Robert
Barnett, sued for bias because he was
turned down for a permanent mailroom
job that he sought because of a back
injury. His bosses said he lacked the
seniority for a regular mailroom position.
The two cases are
testing the law
opportunities for
disabilities.
the latest in a series
intended to create
people who have
Employers and advocates for the disabled
are particularly watching the Toyota case,
the first major test since 1999 of what
disabilities are covered by the ADA.
The question is whether an impairment
that prevents a worker "from performing
only a limited number of tasks associated
with a specific job" should be considered
a disability. Ella Williams worked as a
paint inspector on the Toyota assembly
line for 3 years. Part of her job required
her to grip a block of wood with a sponge
and wipe down cars. But Williams was
unable to grip the tool or raise her arms as
needed.
After she sued Toyota under the ADA,
claiming it failed to accommodate her,
Toyota countered that her problems were
not covered by the federal law. It said her
carpal tunnel syndrome did not limit her
in any major life activity.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th
Circtuit disagreed, saying she could claim
she was substantially limited because her
impairment made it difficult to perform a
range of tasks. Other lower appeals
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courts have used a tougher standard, and
Toyota urged the justices to take the case
and find that Williams has an isolated
injury that prevented her from only a
narrow set of job-related functions.
Copyright 0 2001 USA Today.
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High Court to Review Suit Against Toyota
Injured Worker Argues She Must be Given Work that She Can Perform
The Couner-Jounal, Louisville, KY
Tuesday, April 17, 2001
Joe Ward
Toyota and a Kentucky woman who
sustained repetitive-motion injuries while
working at the automaker's Georgetown
plant are headed for the U. S. Supreme
Court to see whether Toyota can be
obligated to give her work that an
injured person can do.
The high court agreed yesterday to review
an opinion from the U.S. 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, which
held that the Americans With Disabilities
Act requires such accommodation.
Many injured workers - and a lot of
employers - will be watching the outcome,
especially in light of the Bush
administration's controversial negating of
ergonomics standards set by the Clinton
administration.
The case stems from a lawsuit filed by
Ella Williams, 42, of Cynthiana.
Jeff Savarise, a Louisville attorney who
represents Toyota Motor Manufacturing
Kentucky Inc. in the case, said it will be
October before it reaches oral arguments.
But he agreed with Leslie Rosenbaum, a
Lexington attorney who represents
Williams, that the case will be closely
watched.
"It could show how repetitive motion
injuries to factory workers are going to be
handled nationally," Rosenbaum said. ie
noted that such injuries have become an
increasingly hot issue in high-speed,
modem factories. And President Bush's
action in eliminating standards intended to
reduce such injuries has focused more
attention on the issue.
Williams, who is married and has three
children at home, went to work at Toyota
in 1990 and sustained her injuries working
on an engine line.
"I used several pneumatic tools," she said.
"Power wrenches to tighten bolts and
nuts. There was a high number of flexing
and bending actions, and also a lot of
reaching overhead. There was a lot of
vibration."
Doctors at the Kleinert Kutz & Associates
Hand Care Center in Louisville soon told
her that she had carpal tunnel syndrome
and wouldn't be able to do that kind of
work anymore.
She sued Toyota for accommodation in
1993 and was put to work as a paint
inspector. She did that job without
problem for more than two years.
Then she was asked to do another job,
under a Toyota policy of rotating people
through more than one job to increase
their workplace flexibility. The second job
involved gripping a sponge and applying
oil that would make defects more visible.
She had to reach and to lift her arms
above her shoulders repeatedly.
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Williams said that brought her arm
problems back, with additional pain and
numbness in her hands, shoulders and
neck.
She asked to return to the duties she could
do, and there is disagreement about
whether Toyota refused. In any case, she
was soon fired. That was in December
1996, and she filed another suit early the
next year.
Rosenbaum and Savarise said the issue is
whether Williams is disabled under the
language of the disabilities act. It says a
person is disabled if he or she has a
physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more life
actvities.
The federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, charged with
making rules for the act, said such
activities include performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
learning and working.
Savarise said Toyota believes the inability
to do a few tasks specific to one job does
not substantially limit a life activity.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, where Williams filed
suit, agreed.
But the 6th Circuit appeals court held that
her injuries do qualify as a disability
because they keep her from doing the
major life activity of doing manual tasks.
Rosenbaum noted that the question of
whether Toyota must accommodate
Williams - say, by giving her back the job
she could do - has not been addressed yet.
If the Supreme Court upholds the 6th
Circuit, the case would go back to the
district court, where that and other
questions would be hashed out.
Williams said she is not sure now that she
could do the work she formerly did. "With
the added injury from trying to do the job
I couldn't do, I'm not sure I could do any
of it," she said.
She said she has difficulty with such
household tasks as washing dishes,
vacuuming and preparing meals.
Her goal with the suit, she said, "is
basically to give Toyota a stricter guideline
that they have to abide by.
"I would like to get the law to where they
have to recognize that everyone is an
individual" who will react to strain in a
way different from others - "so they don't
just use you, abuse you and put you on the
street."
Rosenbaum said that, depending on how
the case comes out, Williams might also
win damages for lost past wages from the
$50,000-a-year job and lost future wages,
as well as for humiliation, pain and
suffering.
Savanise said he thinks the Supreme
Court's interest in the case is a point for
Toyota's side. He said he believes the 6th
Circuit created a sort of "hybrid" life
activity - "manual tasks related to work" -
that won't hold up.
The high court may be interested in the
case because several circuit courts have
split on the issue - three others taking
views opposed to that taken by the 6th
Circuit - or because there is so much
interest in repetitive-motion injuries, he
said.
Savarise said the Bush reversal of Clinton
on the ergonomics issue could also figure
in, though it has no direct bearing on the
case. "But who knows what motivating
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effect that might have had on the court?"
he asked.
The Kentucky case is one of two that the
Supreme Court agreed to hear to clarify
workers' protection under the disabilities
act. The other case involves a US Airways
employee in San Francisco who says his
disability entitles him to buck a company
seniority system in order to transfer to a
job he is able to perform.
The employee, customer-service
representative Robert Barnett,
sought a transfer after hurting his back
loading baggage in 1990. He asked to be
assigned to a mailroom job, but
employees with more seniority wanted the
same job. Under the usual seniority rules,
they would have bumped Barnett to a less
desirable job.
Bamett was given the mailroom job
temporarily, but in 1993 he was told it
would end. The airline suggested he look
for another assignment in the company.
Barnett declined and sued, alleging the
airline violated the disabilities act by
failing to make reasonable
accommodation for his disability.
US Airways claimed that it was not
obligated to set aside its seniority system
for Bamett, and a federal court agreed.
A panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the lower court, but the
full 9th Circuit Court niled Barnett's case
could go to trial. The appeals court said a
seniority system alone does not absolve
employers from seeking solutions under
the disabilities act.
Copyright ( 2001 Courier-Journal
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00-1250 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
Ruling Below (9' Cr. (en banc), 228 F.3d 1105, 69 U.S.L.W. 1214, 10 AD. Cas. 1761):
Employer's failure to engage in good faith interactive process with disabled employee to
identify potential reasonable accommodation of disability may result in liability under
Americans with Disabilities Act if reasonable accommodation would have been possible;
employer's unilaterally imposed seniority system is not per se bar to reassignment of disabled
employee to vacant job as reasonable accommodation of disability but is factor to be
considered in deciding whether reassignment would impose "undue hardship" on employer
within meaning of ADA.
Question Presented: Does ADA, as en banc Ninth Circuit held below, require employer to
reassign disabled employee to different position as "reasonable accommodation" even
though another employee is entitled to hold position under employer's bona fide and
established seniority system, or, as other courts of appeals have held, does ADA's
"reasonable accommodation" requirement not compel employer to disregard rights of other
employees under its seniority policy?
Robert BARNETT, Plaintiff-Appeallant
V.
U.S. Air, Inc., Defendant-Appellee
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Grcuit
Decided October 4, 2000
BettyB. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:
Robert Barnett brought suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and he appeals the district court's
dismissal on summary judgment of his
claims. Bamett, who suffered a serious
back injury while on the job, argues that
U.S. Air discriminated against him bydenying him accommodation, by failing
to engage in the interactive process and
by retaliating against him for filing
charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOq). This
appeal raises several issues of first
impression in this circuit, including the
nature and scope of an employer's
obligation to engage in the interactive
process, whether reassignment is a
reasonable accommodation in the
context of a seniority system and the
appropriate standard for evaluating
retaliation claims under the ADA We
reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of U.S. Air
on all claims except for the retaliation
claim and we remand for trial.
I
Robert Barnett worked for ten years as a
customer service agent for U.S. Air and
its predecessor, Pacific Southwest
Airlines. In 1990, Barnett injured hisback while working in a cargo position
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for U.S. Air at San Francisco
International Airport. After returning
from disability leave, Barnett found that
he could not perform all of the physical
requirements of handling freight. Barnett
used his seniority to transfer into the
company's mail room.
In March and August of 1992, Barnett's
doctor and chiropractor both
recommended that he avoid heavy lifting
and excessive bending, twisting, turning,
pushing and pulling, and prolonged
standing or sitting. The doctor
concluded that Barnett could perform
the job requirements of the swing-shift
mail room position. Barnett learned in
August of 1992 that two employees with
greater seniority planned to exercise their
seniority right to transfer to the mail
room. Once bumped, Bamett's seniority
would have limited him to transferring to
jobs in the cargo area. Barnett wrote to
his station manager, Robert Benson, on
August 31, 1992 and requested that he
be allowed to stay in the mail room as a
reasonable accommodation under the
ADA-
U.S. Air did not respond to Bamett for
five months but allowed him to remain
in the mail room for the period while the
company was evaluating his claims. On
January 20, 1993, Benson, acting on
behalf of U.S. Air, informed Bamett that
he would be removed from the mail
room and placed on job injury leave.
There was no substantive discussion of
Bamett's accommodation request.
Following the meeting, Bamett sent
Benson a second letter suggesting two
alternative means of accommodating his
disability. Barnett proposed either that
U.S. Air provide him with special lifting
equipment in the cargo facility or that
the cargo job be restructured so that he
would do only warehouse office work.
Barnett filed formal charges of
discrimination with the EEOC in
February of 1993. On March 4, 1993,
Barnett received a letter from U.S. Air's
Vice President of Human Resources
denying Barnett's alternative requests for
accommodation but informing him that
he could bid for any job within his
restrictions. There is no evidence that
Bamett was qualified, without reasonable
accommodation, for any other position
in San Francisco or elsewhere in the U.S.
Air system. Barnett made no subsequent
bids for any other position. In August of
1994, the EEOC issued a formal
determination that there was reason to
believe that U.S. Air had discriminated
against Bamett by denying him
reasonable accommodation under the
ADA.
After Barnett filed suit, the district court
granted U.S. Air's motion for summary
judgment for all claims except Bamett's
claim that U.S. Air discriminated by not
participating in the interactive process.
Upon receiving supplementary briefing,
the district court granted summary
judgment to U.S. Air on that claim as
well. Barnett, in his appeal, argues that
U.S. Air violated the ADA by failing to
engage in the interactive process, by
failing to reassign him to the mail room,
by failing to provide other reasonable
accommodation and by retaliating
against him.
III
Bamett argues that it would have been a
reasonable accommodation for U.S. Air
to allow him to remain in the mail room,
by making an exception to its seniority
policy. The ADA explicitly states that
reasonable accommodation may include
reassignment. Sw 42 U.S.C 5
12111(9)(B). The key questions are
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whether a seniority system is a per se bar
to reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation and whether a disabled
employee seeking reasonable
accommodation should have priority in
reassignment.
The EEOCs enforcement guidance
makes it clear that reassignment is a
reasonable accommodation to which
disabled employees should have priority
over non-disabled employees and even
when transfers are normally not allowed:
The ADA requires employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to
individuals with disabilities, including
reassignment, even though they are not
available to others. Therefore, an
employer who does not normally
transfer employees would still have to
reassign an employee with a disability,
unless it could show that the
reassignment caused an undue hardship.
And, if an employer has a policy
prohibiting transfers, it would have to
modify that policy in order to reassign an
employee with a disability, unless it could
show undue hardship.
EEOC Erfourrnt Guadana, EEOC
Compliance Manual at 5454.
The EEOC explains that a modification
in workplace policy can be a reasonable
accommodation, absent undue hardship:
"[Reassignment] must be provided to an
employee who, because of a disability,
can no longer perform the essential
functions of his/her current position,
with or without reasonable
accommodation, unless the employer can
show that it would be undue hardship.'
Id at 5452.
U.S. Air argues that the ADA guarantees
Barnett no more than the opportunity to
apply for and compete for reassignment.
However, the EEOC leaves no doubt
that reassignment involves more than a
mere opportunity for disabled employees
to compete: "Reassignment means that
the employee gets the vacant position if
s/he is qualified for it. Otherwise,
reassignment would be of little value and
would not be implemented as Congress
intended." Id at 5456.
En banc decisions in several circuits
adopt the EEOCs position. In Aka v
Washi*r= Hapital Cter 156 F.3d 1284
(D.CCir.1998) (en banc), the D.C
Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the
argument that reassignment entitles a
disabled employee to nothing more than
a chance to compete for a position. The
D.C Circuit explained that the view that
the ADA requires no priority for
disabled employees in reassignment
"misunderstand[s] both the text and
legislative history of the statute, and
deviate[s] from the construction of the
statute by other circuits ... Indeed the
ADA's reference to reassignment would
be redundant if permission to apply were
all it meant." Id at 1304.
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, also
made clear that the ADA's "reassignment
obligation must mean something more
than merely allowing a disabled person
to compete equally with the rest of the
world" and pointed out that
reassignment is "one of the forms of
reasonable accommodation specifically
mentioned by the statute to be utilized if
necessary and reasonable to keep an
existing disabled employee employed by
the company." Srrth, 180 F.3d at 1165.
The question of whether an employer's
unilaterally imposed seniority system
trumps a disabled employee's right to
reassignment has not been answered
directly by any other circuit. 11 Although
At best other circuits have opined in dicta as towhat approaches the courts should take. In Snith
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there is no legislative history specifically
180 F.3d at 1176, the Tenth Circuit, in discussing
the various situations an employer might face in
making a reassignment opined (although the
issue was not before it) that "an industry may
have a well entrenched seniority system which,
even though not rooted in a collective bargaining
agreement, is so well established that it gives rise
to legitimate expectations by other, more senior
employees to a job that the disabled employee
might desire. Requiring an employer to disrupt
and violate any such well-established reasonable
expectations of seniority rights in order to favor
a disabled employee in a job reassignment could,
at least under some circumstances, constitute a
fundamental and unreasonable alteration in the
nature of the employer's business." The court
cites to Aka at 156 F.3d at 1305. Aka had at issue
a dispute over Aka's job qualifications and the
meaning of the collective bargaining agreement
that allowed the employer latitude in some
circumstances in reassignment of disabled
employees after stating "It seems clear that WHC
[the employer] had power under Section 14.5 of
the CBA to reassign its disabled employees to
vacant positions in at least some circumstances."
Id at 1303. It remanded for trial. The court
concluded with this statement: "Given the large
number of contingencies that could preclude
such a conflict, we see no need to address
whether, if such a conflict arose, the CBA or the
ADA would give way in the circumstances of
this case." Id at 1306. Aka refers to DAm i
Suhmu-IsuQu A utauz Ir. 141 F.3d 667 (7th
Cir.1998). The issues before the Seventh Circuit
were the qualifications of disabled employees for
available jobs: "If any of the plaintiffs had been
able to point to a particular job that was filled by
a temporary worker while a plaintiff was on
disability leave, and then had been able to show
that he or she could have done that job consistent
with the relevant qualifications, summary
judgment would have been wrong. But no one
was able to do so." Id at 679-80. In dicta, it
opined that the duties of the employer under the
ADA to reassign do not go so far as to extend
[the duty to reassign] "to virtually every other
job in a company, from the president to the
janitors. Nothing in the ADA requires an
employer to abandon its legitimate,
nondiscriminatory company policies defining
job qualifications, prerequisites, and entitlements
to intra-company transfers." Id
on a seniority system outside of the
collective bargaining context, the
legislative history that does exist argues
against any per se rule barring
reassignment in the context of seniority
systems.
The legislative history indicates that a
collective bargaining agreement can be a
factor in determining the reasonableness
of an accommodation but rejects any per
se bar. As explained in the House
Report:
if a collective bargaining agreement
reserves certain jobs for employees with
a given amount of seniority, it may be
considered as a factor in determining
whether it is a reasonable
accommodation to assign an employee
with a disability without seniority to the
job. However, the agreement would not
be determinative on the issue.
HRRep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63
(1990), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
at 345; se also S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 32
(1989). In addition to rejecting a per se
bar, both reports envision that collective
bargaining agreements will incorporate
provisions allowing for compliance with
the ADA "by ensuring that agreements
negotiated after the effective date of this
title contain a provision permitting the
employer to take all actions necessary to
comply with this legislation." Id
The EEOC also rejects any blanket rule
that a collective bargaining agreement
trumps a reasonable accommodation:
"In the EEOC's view, such a per se rule
nullifies Congress' intent that undue
hardship always be determined on a
case- by-case basis." EEOC Gmadarr
EEOC Compliance Manual at 5463.
Instead, the EEOC requires a fact
specific analysis which treats the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) as
another factor in judging undue
hardship:
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First, an employer should determine if it
could provide a reasonable
accommodation that would remove the
workplace barrier without violating theCBA. If no reasonable accommodation
exists that avoids violating the CBA,
then the ADA requires an employer and
a union, as a collective bargaining
representative, to negotiate in good faith
a variance to the CBA so that the
employer may provide a reasonable
accommodation, except if the proposed
accommodation unduly burdens the
expectations of other workers (i.e.,
causes undue hardship). Undue hardship
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis
to determine the extent to which the
proposed accommodation would affect
the expectations of other employees.
Among the relevant factors to assess
would be the duration and severity of
any adverse effects caused by granting a
variance and the number of employees
whose employment opportunities would
be affected by the variance.
Id
Both the legislative history and the
EEOC reject any per se rule barring
reasonable accommodation even when
reassignment would conflict with a
collective bargaining agreement.12 Here,
12 Despite this guidance in the legislativehistory and the EEOC, most circuits including
our own have reached the opposite conclusion
and held that the ADA does not require an
accommodation which conflicts with a collectivebargaining agreement. See azi Fkn-da Paver &
L Ia 205 F.3d 31 1307 (11 Cir.200);WMV LakA so,162 F3d 561 (9thQEr.19; Fe! ~znon v Sat efR~xSo& sanc
160 F.3d 780 787 (1s Cir.1998) 
_ GssiJ
Daerwi Edicn (.b, 138 3 629. 634 (6 hCr199-8) K-alik v LE& ,n 130 F.3d 76 83 (3dCir.1997'); Fare',un v Bank & Lrd ao 117F.3d 80 81 (5th Cir.1997); f11~4 , JgjCbVp. 94 .3d 1041 1051 t C19) Mjr
So-rtw. JIm 53 F.3d 111 1 90h.96 5
where there is no collective bargaining
agreement, no bargained for rights are
involved. It would seem that the
seniority system without more should
not bar reassignment. Without
reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation, even in the context of a
seniority system, the goals of the ADA
could easily be frustrated. Any per se rule
barring reassignment because of conflicts
with a seniority system would sharply
limit the range of available
accommodations without any required
showing of an undue burden on the
employer. In many cases this would
eliminate the most effective or the only
effective reasonable accommodation.
A per se bar conflicts with the basic
premise of the ADA, which grounds
accommodation in the individualized
needs of the disabled employee and the
specific burdens which such
accommodation places on an employer.
Only in the event of "undue hardship"
can a senionty system be a bar to
reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C S12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA defines
"undue hardship" as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense." 42U.S.C. 12111(10)(A). The statute offers a
list of factors to be considered in
appraising whether there is unduehardship, including the cost of the
accommodation, the overall financial
resources of the company and the scopeof the employer's operations. See 42
Bemcn L omhvst Aj ii 62 F.3d 118 1114 th
a-1~995). Wlz& has been held in abeyancepending the completion of the en bancproceedings in this case. None of the cases listedin this footnote confronted the questionpresented to us-we confront a seniority system
not grounded in a collective bargaining
agreement.
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U.S.C. 12111(10)(B).13 While
reassignment might constitute an undue
burden in some cases, courts cannot
assume that which is the employer's
burden to prove.
We hold that reassignment is a
reasonable accommodation and that a
seniority system is not a per se bar to
reassignment. However, a seniority
system is a factor in the undue hardship
analysis. A case-by-case fact intensive
analysis is required to determine whether
any particular reassignment would
constitute an undue hardship to the
employer. If there is no undue hardship,
a disabled employee who seeks
reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation, if otherwise qualified
13 The ADA has no language protecting the
operation of a "bona fide seniority system"
similar to that which is included in Title VII. See
42 U.S.C 2000e-2(h). We note that the "undue
hardship" standard in the ADA is substantially
more demanding than the hardship standard in
Title VII in the context of "reasonable
accommodation" for the religion of employees.
See Tram Wold Aiir v Hanriison 432 U.S. 63.
84, 97 S.G. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977); Balint v
Gmyon Gtt Neuada 180 F,3d 1047, 1053 (9th
Cir.1999) (en banc) (relying on Hankiin in a
religious discrimination claim brought under
Title VII). The legislative history supports this
interpretation. See S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 36
(1989) ("The Committee wishes to make it clear
that the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court in TWA v Hankls, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct.
2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), are not applicable to
this legislation.); see also H. Rep. No. 101-485,
pt. 2, at 68 (1990) ("By contrast, under the ADA,
reasonable accommodation must be provided
unless they rise to the level of 'requiring
significant difficulty or expense' on the part of
the employer, in light of the factors noted in the
statute-- i.e., a significantly higher standard than
that articulated in Haii This higher standard
is necessary in light of the crucial role that
reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring
meaningful employment opportunities for people
with disabilities.")
for a position, should receive the
position rather than merely have an
opportunity to compete with non-
disabled employees.
Summary judgment was inappropriate in
this case. Barnett initiated the interactive
process and suggested remaining in the
mail room as his preferred
accommodation. U.S. Air did not show
that the proposed accommodation was
an undue hardship. Barnett already
occupied the mail room position at the
time of his request for reasonable
accommodation. Therefore, permanently
reassigning Barnett to the mail room
position as a reasonable accommodation
did not require "bumping" any other
employee from the position. While this
accommodation would eliminate one
position from the seniority bid process,
U.S. Air has failed to demonstrate that
doing so would cause an undue hardship.
It would need to demonstrate that
accommodating Barnett in this fashion
would cause undue disruption in its
seniority system. In its rebuttal, U.S. Air
offered only the statement of its Vice
President of Human Resources, who
feared a "domino effect," and a copy of
its seniority policy. Yet the record
provides no information concerning the
number of ADA claimants at U.S. Air,
their seniority, or their need to be
accommodated by exceptions to the
seniority rules.14 Mere speculation is
insufficient to support summary
judgment that the requested
accommodation would impose undue
hardship. We hold that a triable issue of
fact exists.
14 Interestingly, U.S. Air does provide an
exception in its seniority system for catastrophic
illness.
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VWe reverse the district court's summary
judgment dismissal of Barnett's ADA
discrimination claims. U.S. Air has failed
to engage in good faith in the interactive
process. U.S. Air should face liability for
the remedies imposed by the statute if
reasonable accommodation would be
possible without an undue hardship to
the company. Barnett's request to remain
in the mail room was a reasonable
accommodation absent proof of undue
hardship and possible accommodations
in the cargo facility may have been
reasonable accommodations absent
proof of undue hardship. Only a trial can
resolve the factual dispute over whether
reasonable accommodation can be made
for Barnett. Therefore, Barnett's
discrimination claims should be
remanded to the district court for trial.
The district court's summary judgment
dismissal of Barnett's retaliation claims is
affirmed.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in
part and REMANDED.
RONALD M. GOULD, Circuit Judge,
with whom Circuit Judge THOMAS,
joins, Concurring: (Deleted)
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge, with
whom Circuit Judges TROTI and
KLEINFELD join, dissenting: (Deleted
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High Court to Hear Disability Cases
Associated Press
Monday, April 16, 2001
Laurie Asseo
The Supreme Court said Monday it will
clarify the Americans with Disabilities
Act's protections for workers who are
partly disabled or can be accommodated
only by sidestepping a company's
seniority system.
The justices said they will hear two cases.
One involves a former worker at a
Toyota manufacturing plant in Kentucky
who says she is partly disabled but still
able to perform some duties.
In the other, a US Airways employee in
San Francisco says his disability entitled
him to buck the company's seniority
system to transfer to a job he was able to
perform.
In both cases, lower courts ruled that the
employees could pursue their claims.
The ADA, enacted in 1990, is perhaps
best known for requiring wheelchair
ramps in buildings across the country. Itbans job discrimination against the
disabled, requiring employers to offer
reasonable accommodations to disabled
people who are otherwise qualified to
perform jobs.
The law defines disability as "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities,"
such as working or caring for oneself.
The former Toyota plant worker, Ella
Williams, says she suffers from repetitive
strain injuries that prevent her from
performing part of her assembly-line job
in Georgetown, Ky.
Williams started work in 1990 and within
months developed repetitive stress injuries
in her wrists, neck and arms. After her
earlier ADA lawsuit was settled in 1993,
she returned to Toyota with a doctor's
instructions to perform only light duty.
Toyota said it tried to accommodate
Williams. In 1996, Toyota told Williams
that all quality inspectors must be able to
do four different inspection jobs. Williams
said one of the new tasks caused pain and
numbness in her arms, hands, shoulders
and neck.
She asked to return to her previous
assignment, but eventually she was fired.
Williams sued again under the ADA,
saying Toyota did not make proper
accommodation for her disability.
A federal judge granted Toyota's request
to dismiss the case, but the 6th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
Williams could pursue her claim. Even
though she can perform some manual
tasks, she is substantially limited in
performing assembly-line work and
therefore is considered disabled under the
ADA, the court said.
Toyota's appeal to the Supreme Court said
people should not be considered disabled
under the law if they are unable to
perform only part of their job.
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In the case involving US Airways,
customer service representative Robert
Barnett sought a transfer after hurting his
back loading baggage at San Francisco
International Airport in 1990.
Bamett was given a job in the mailroon,
but employees with more seniority wanted
the same job. Under the usual seniority
rules they could bump him to a less
desirable job.
Barnett asked to stay in the mailroom as
an accommodation under the ADA, but
the airline suggested he look for another
assignment in the company. Barnett
declined and sued in 1994, saying the
airline violated the disability law.
US Airways said it was not obligated to set
aside its seniority system for Barnett. A
federal judge and a three-judge panel of
the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed.
The full 9th Circuit court reversed that
decision and ruled that Barnett's case
could go to trial. A seniority system alone
does not absolve employers from seeking
solutions under the ADA, the court said.
The cases are Toyota v. Williams, 00-
1089, and US Airways v. Bamett,
00-1250.
Copyright 0 2001 The Associated Press.
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High Court to Hear Cases on ADA Rights
The Wall StretJourmal
Tuesday, April 17, 2001
Robert S. Greenberger
In moves that could reach deep into the
U.S. workplace, the Supreme Court
agreed to review whether the Americans
with Disabilities Act protects people
with limited disabilities, such as
repetitive-motion injuries, and whether
the law requires employers to ignore
seniority systems to accommodate
disabled workers.
The issues are presented in a pair of
cases the high court will decide in the
term beginning in October. In recent
years, the court has narrowed the
definition of who is covered under the
law, ruling that it doesn't apply to
correctable conditions, such as vision
impairment that can be improved with
eyeglasses, or ailments that can be
controlled with medication, such as high
blood pressure.
About 25,000 to 30,000 employees a year
lose work time because of carpal- tunnel
syndrome, a repetitive-motion injury of
the wrist. Forcing employers to choose
whether to accommodate disabled
workers or seniority rights could produce
worker-management strains.
One of the two cases to be reviewed
involves Ella Williams. In 1990, she went
to work on a Toyota Motor Corp.
assembly line in Georgetown, Ky. Within
months, according to her attorneys, shedeveloped carpal-tunnel syndrome and
tendinitis in her neck and arms. Though
the Japanese auto maker assigned her to a
different job, involving quality-control
inspections, her problems returned.
When Ms. Williams refused to continue in
a different quality-control job, her
employment was terminated. She sued the
company under the ADA, claiming the
auto maker failed to make a reasonable
accommodation for her condition.
The 1990 law defines "disability" as a
physical or mental impairment that
"substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities." Toyota claimed Ms.
Williams was unable to perform only a
limited number of functions and that she
remained "perfectly capable of executing a
host of manual tasks."
A U.S. district court granted the
company's motion for summary judgment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled that Ms.
Williams was disabled, as defined by the
ADA-
Peg Seminario, director of safety and
health for the AFL-CIO, which sides with
Ms. Williams, said impairments resultingfrom carpal-tunnel syndrome can be
"career-ending, life-altering, serious,disabling injuries" and are responsible for
more time off the job than any other type
of workplace injury.
Baruch Fellner, an attorney in theWashington office of the law firm
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, warned that
covering carpal-turinel injuries under theADA may carry risks for employees. Mr.
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Fellner, who specializes in this field, noted
that employers have medical tests
available to detect propensities for such
injuries, potentially allowing companies to
"weed out employees before they hire
then."
(Toyota v. Williams)
The other ADA case involves Robert
Barnett, a US Airways Group Inc. cargo-
area employee who injured his back on
the job in 1990. He sought to transfer to a
position in the mail room, but under the
company's longstanding seniority policy,
that and some other positions were
opened to bidding based on seniority.
The airline offered Mr. Barnett a
temporary slot in the mail room, but said
that, based on seniority, they couldn't
keep a permanent position for him there.
He was advised that he would be placed
on job-injury leave, because his injury
prevented him from returning to work in
the cargo area to which his seniority
entitled him. In November 1994, Mr.
Barnett sued the company in U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of
California under the ADA, arguing the
airline failed to find a reasonable
accommodation for his disability as the
law required.
The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of US Airways, but the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in San Francisco ruled the
company should have made an exception
to its seniority policy to enable him to
have a permanent job in the mail room.
(US Airways v. Barnett)
Copyright © 2001, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc
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Also This Tenn:
00-758 U.S. Postal Service v. Gregory
Ruling Below (Fed. Cir., 212 F.3d 1296)
Merit Systems Protection Board may not rely upon prior disciplinary actions against federal
employee that are subject of ongoing proceeding challenging their merits m assessing
reasonableness of penalty imposed by employing agency in taking adverse action.
Question Presented: May federal agency, when disciplining or removing employee for
misconduct pursuant to 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, take account of prior disciplinary
actions that are subject of pending grievance proceedings?
00-927 Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, Inc.
Ruling Below (MalBay Dnility Inc v Henmn, 5th Cir., 212 F.3d 898, 18 O.S.H Ca.
2161):
Occupational Safety and Health Act by its own terms, 29 U.S.C §653(b) (1), does not apply
to "working conditions of employees with respect to which other Federal agencies ...
exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting
occupational safety or health," and, accordingly, because U.S. Coast Guard has exclusivejurisdiction over regulation of working conditions of seamen serving on vessels operating on
navigable waters, Occupational Safety and Health Administration lacked authority to regulate
working conditions of employees aboard drilling barge operating on navigable waterway andin issuing citation against drilling firm in connection with explosion aboard barge.
Question Presented: Has U.S. Coast Guard "exercise[d] statutory authority to prescribe orenforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or health" concerning
"working conditions of employees" (29 U.S.C §653(b)(1)) on "uninspected vessels" (46US.C §2101(43)) so as to displace application of 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act,29 U.S.C 5651 et seq.?
00-1072 Edelman v. Lynchburg College
Ruling Below (4th Cir., 228 F.3d 503, 69 U.S.L.W. 1216, 83 Fair Ernpl. Prac.Cas. 1708):Federal regulation, 29 CF.R. 51601.12(b), authorizing amendment of discrimination chargeunder Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act to cure failure to verify and allowing amene
chage o "elae bck to original charge conflicts with Title VII requiment that verifiedcharge be filed within applicable limitations period; equitable tolling of lirmen s perioi
not warranted in case in which charging party was represented by counsel at all stages of
administrative process, waited more than five months after alleged discrimination before
even contacting Equal Employment opportunity Commission, ard failed to Promptly signand return to EEOC draft charge that included form of oath or affirmation.
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Question Presented: Is 29 C.F.R. §1601.12(b), which provides that Title VII "charge may
be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including the failure to verify the
charge," invalid?
00-1614 National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan
Ruling Below (9' Cir., 232 F.3d 1008, 69 U.S.L.W. 1296, 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 225):
Consistent systematic pattern of discrimination and retaliation against employee by core
cadre of managers from time of hiring, as well as their creation of hostile environment for
employee, supports finding of continuing violation that justifies imposition of liability under
Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act for unlawful conduct of which employee was aware prior
to applicable limitations period.
Question Presented: did Ninth Circuit correctly hold, in conflict with every other circuit
that has decided question, that plaintiff who has knowingly allowed statute of limitations to
lapse on alleged violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes may nevertheless sue on
such time-barred claims whenever incidents within limitations period are "sufficiently
related" to otherwise time-barred claims?
00-6029 Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc.
Ruling Below (8t Cir., 218 F.3d 933, 69 U.S.L.W. 1060):
Family and Medical Leave Act regulations providing that employee's paid or unpaid leave
does not count against statute's 12-week unpaid leave entitlement unless employer gives
employee prospective notice to that effect are contrary to statute and therefore invalid.
Question Presented: Under FMLA, which requires covered employers to provide eligible
employees with "total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period" for specified
reasons, including leave needed "[biecause of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee," did secretary
of labor act permissibly in providing by regulation that (with certain exceptions) employer-
provided leave does not cont against FMLA's 12-week entitlement until employer notifies
employee of its designation as FMLA leave?
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